ABSTRACT After having a utilitarian experience, consumers may prefer to have another utilitarian experience or a hedonic experience. Similarly, after having a hedonic experience, consumers may prefer to have another hedonic experience or a utilitarian experience. We propose that the cognitive processes involved in analyzing the benefits of an experience that differs on the hedonic-utilitarian dimension require mental resources. As a result, after having an initial experience, consumers who have (vs. do not have) a high level of mental resources are better able to identify the benefits of a dissimilar experience and show higher preference for this experience. This suggests that an initial utilitarian experience will lead to preference for a hedonic experience when consumers have a high level of mental resources available, but a utilitarian experience when they do not. These findings have implications for how consumers combine multiple experiences, seek pleasure, and exert self-control.
A n important distinction in consumer research is the extent to which a product or experience is hedonic or utilitarian. Hedonic experiences are visceral, affectively appealing, and focused on seeking pleasure. Utilitarian experiences are instrumental, cognitively appealing, and focused on functionality (Hirschman and Holbrook 1982; Batra and Ahtola 1991; Strahilevitz and Myers 1998; Read, Loewenstein, and Kalynaraman 1999; Dhar and Wertenbroch 2000; Laran and Wilcox 2011) . Although both types of experience offer benefits to consumers, they fulfill conflicting goals. Utilitarian experiences are more associated with a self-control goal, whereas hedonic experiences are more associated with a pleasure-seeking goal. In the present research, we investigate how hedonic experiences influence consumers' likelihood of seeking a utilitarian experience and vice versa. As an example, imagine that you were invited for an afternoon ride in a friend's Porsche. After enjoying the ride, would you be more likely to seek out another hedonic experience such as watching a comedy, or shift to a more utilitarian experience such as watching a newly released documentary at home?
Several streams of research have examined consumer preference for similar or dissimilar experiences in a sequence (Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1988; Kahn 1995; Read and Loewenstein 1995; Dhar and Simonson 1999; Read et al. 1999; Inman 2001) . The goal pursuit literature investigates when the pursuit of a goal increases or decreases subsequent pursuit of the same goal, which typically involves sequential choices in domains related to utilitarian and hedonic experiences (Baumeister et al. 1998; Fishbach and Dhar 2005; Laran and Janiszewski 2009; Inzlicht and Schmeichel 2012) . This research generally finds that consumers tend to balance different goals, and that when consumers perceive that they have sufficiently pursued a goal (e.g., have achieved a self-control goal or have achieved a pleasure-seeking goal), they tend to shift to activities associated with an alternative goal (e.g., activities that are more hedonic or activities that are more utilitarian). In the present research, we propose an alternative process that may determine preference for a dissimilar type of experience after having an initial experience.
We build upon the idea of "shifting priorities" (Inzlicht, Schmeichel, and Macrae 2014) to demonstrate that preference for shifting from one type of experience to another may be influenced by the level of mental resources consumers have available to process the benefits of an experience. When consumers have an initial experience, the utilitarian or hedonic benefits of this experience are salient, making it easier to consider the benefits of a similar experience (e.g., a utilitarian experience after having had an initial utilitarian experience) than a dissimilar experience (e.g., a hedonic experience after having had an initial utilitarian experience; Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1988; Ward and Mann 2000; Ward 2004, 2007; Levav, Reinholtz, and Linn 2012; Inzlicht et al. 2014) .
We argue that because it is more difficult to shift one's focus to the benefits of the (less salient) dissimilar experience, mental resources will determine whether consumers will engage in this process. Specifically, having more mental resources can help a consumer process the benefits of a dissimilar experience. Being able to process the benefits of an experience will increase its attractiveness and likelihood that people will engage in it. As a result, consumers who currently have (vs. do not have) a high level of mental resources have higher relative preference for a dissimilar experience. This implies a bidirectional effect that adds to current knowledge on how consumers combine different experiences (Laran and Janiszewski 2011) . More (vs. fewer) mental resources will lead consumers to prefer a hedonic experience after having had a utilitarian experience, as identified in previous research (e.g., Inzlicht et al. 2014) . In addition, more mental resources will lead consumers to prefer a utilitarian experience after having had a hedonic experience, an effect of mental resources that has not been demonstrated before. In the next section, we explain the reasoning behind our predictions, which can contribute to the understanding of consumer phenomena involving mental resource utilization, multiple experiences, pleasure seeking, and self-control.
WHEN CONSUMERS SHIFT TO ALTERNATIVE GOALS
Several findings demonstrate that pursuit of a goal often leads to the subsequent pursuit of an alternative goal (Dhar and Simonson 1999; Baumeister 2002; Novemsky and Ratner 2003; Fishbach and Dhar 2005) . Recent research (Inzlicht and Berkman 2012; Inzlicht and Schmeichel 2012; Inzlicht et al. 2014) argues that the perception that a person has achieved a goal is the driver of a subsequent willingness to pursue an alternative goal (Laran and Janiszewski 2009; Inzlicht and Schmeichel 2012) . Laran and Janiszewski (2009) , for example, propose that this perception of goal achievement leads to inhibition of the recently achieved goal and activation of goals that have been recently inhibited. In the case of self-control, when a consumer is pursuing a self-control goal, a pleasure-seeking goal is inhibited. Once the selfcontrol goal has been achieved, it enables the activation of the pleasure-seeking goal, which had been inhibited during the pursuit of self-control.
Similarly, the "process model of self-control failure" (Robinson, Schmeichel, and Inzlicht 2010; Inzlicht and Schmeichel 2012; Inzlicht et al. 2014) , initially developed to provide an alternative explanation to self-control resource depletion, postulates that when people exert self-control, they prioritize goals associated with self-control, such as being healthy. Once they have dedicated effort to exerting self-control, their priorities shift. At this point, the priority is not to exert self-control anymore but to pursue goals associated with seeking pleasure, such as indulging. This implies that a shift in priorities is adaptive, as exerting self-control allows people to subsequently pursue alternative goals that are also important to them.
The current research builds upon the idea of shifting priorities and proposes that mental resources play a central role in determining preference for similar and dissimilar experiences. We define mental resource as a resource utilized to promote cognitive output, enabling mental operations such as thinking and executive function (Albarracín et al. 2008; Diamond 2013) . Two factors can determine mental resource utilization. First, it can be determined by the absolute amount of mental resources available at a given time, which can vary throughout the day depending on factors such as available working memory, fatigue, and glucose level (Macrae, Hewstone, and Griffiths 1993; Nilsson et al. 2005; Gailliot 2008 ). For example, an individual who is tired or performing a cognitively taxing task is not likely to have mental resources available and is thus less likely to use mental resources. Second, even if mental resources are available, their utilization can be determined by willingness to recruit and use these resources (Navon 1984) . Just as we have some control over expending available monetary resources or leaving them in the bank, we also have control over whether we want to expend available mental resources. For example, an individual may have a high level of mental resources in the morning. This individual can choose to not recruit them by just watching mindless television, or use them on a more cognitively demanding task, such as writing a paper for a special issue in the Journal of the Association for Consumer Research. People's choice to recruit the available mental resources should depend on many factors. One of them is whether it is beneficial to do so in any given context or any given time, which is likely the case when consumers evaluate experiences that offer different types of benefit (we further discuss this issue in the General Discussion).
Using this idea of mental resource availability and utilization, our conceptualization predicts a bidirectional effect not explored in previous research involving the role of mental resources: consumers sometimes are more likely to shift from self-control to pleasure seeking, but also from pleasure seeking to self-control. While previous research has argued that people shift priorities when they perceive they have engaged in enough pursuit of a goal, we will argue that identifying the benefits of a dissimilar experience requires mental resources. As a result, the extent to which consumers have the mental resources to consider the benefits of a dissimilar experience will increase preference for this type of experience. We elaborate on this idea next.
MENTAL RESOURCES AND PROCESSING THE BENEFITS OF AN EXPERIENCE
The process model of self-control, as discussed above, posits that an initial experience involving self-control can lead people to shift their orientation and focus on a different goal. The current research asks whether consumers always show this tendency to shift, and when this shift is more or less likely to occur.
Having an experience can make the benefits of that experience type more salient. To illustrate, when a consumer steps out of a workout studio, the benefits of being healthy are salient and therefore the benefits of eating something healthy may come to mind easily. Alternatively, when a consumer steps off a cruise ship, the benefits of enjoying life are salient and therefore the benefits of having a fun meal may come to mind easily. This implies that preference for shifting to a different type of experience may require more effortful information processing and thus mental resources (Monsell 2003; Dewitte, Bruyneel, and Geyskens 2009) . We rely on the conflict-monitoring hypothesis (Botvinick et al. 2001) to inform this process. The conflict-monitoring hypothesis explains how information processing, in the form of activation and inhibition, aids in the execution of certain tasks. According to this hypothesis, executing a task makes information associated with this task salient, as task execution involves processing information associated with that task while inhibiting information that conflicts with task execution (see also Laran and Janiszewski 2009) . Cognitive control occurs by successfully managing this conflict between different types of information and being able to focus mental resources on the relevant task. Consider a Stroop task, where people have to name the color of certain words while trying to ignore the meaning of these words (e.g., name the color red while it is being used to write the word "green"). Because there is conflict between the color and meaning of the word, people use their mental resources to focus on the current task of naming the color while inhibiting the interfering information, namely, the meaning of the word.
We propose that this process of conflict resolution, and focusing mental resources on currently relevant information, can also influence preference for different experiences (Dewitte et al. 2009 ). The processes described in the conflict-monitoring hypothesis assume that the different types of information or goals an individual is monitoring are potentially in conflict. One important distinction in consumer settings that may create such conflict is hedonic or utilitarian experiences. A hedonic experience is multisensory and associated with pleasure seeking, fun, and excitement (Khan, Dhar, and Wertenbroch 2005) . A utilitarian experience is instrumental and functional (Hirschman and Holbrook 1982; Strahilevitz and Myers 1998) . While both types of experiences offer benefits to the consumer (Okada 2005) , the two represent opposing goals that are often in conflict when consumers form preference. Of course, other types of dissimilarities between experiences can cause conflict and require cognitive control, but experiences that are utilitarian and hedonic are quite relevant to an investigation examining preference when there is conflict between different types of benefit. For these reasons, we focus on the utilitarian-hedonic dimension when conceptualizing about and selecting consumer experiences in our empirical investigation.
As follows from the conceptualization above, information about the initial experience type (i.e., utilitarian or hedonic), which the consumer has focused on, is more salient (Wylie and Allport 2000) . Given that one type of information is more salient, it is easier to process the benefits of an experience that has similar benefits (Ward and Mann 2000; Ward 2004, 2007) , and it is harder to process the benefits of a dissimilar experience, as this type of benefit has been inhibited during the initial experience (Rubinstein, Meyer, and Evans 2001; Monsell 2003) . Thus, while past research suggests that people shift between goals, it also lays out processing costs associated with deciding to shift between goals rather than pursuing a similar goal. Because of the different levels of processing difficulty required, consumers who have a high level of mental resources will have an advantage in processing dissimilar benefits (Bél-anger et al. 2013) .
CURRENT RESEARCH PREDICTIONS
Based on our conceptualization, consider a consumer who has had a utilitarian experience and has a high (vs. low) level of mental resources available. The consumer who has a high level of resources available should be better able to process the benefits of a hedonic experience than a consumer who has a low level of resources available. If a consumer has just watched a documentary, for example, the benefits of learning something useful may be salient, and the benefits of doing something just for fun may not be as salient, unless the consumer has the resources to consider the benefits of a dissimilar experience. Processing the benefits of an experience should make it more attractive, which suggests that people with a high level of mental resources will show higher relative preference for a hedonic experience than people with a low level of mental resources. As opposed to models that only predict that the performance of self-control may lead to pleasure seeking, we predict that the countervailing result should also occur. Pleasure seeking may also lead to the shift of priorities and preference for a utilitarian experience as long as the consumer has the mental resources available to process the benefits of the utilitarian experience.
While our model can predict relative preference between consumers who are currently low on mental resources and consumers who are currently high on mental resources, it could be interesting to ask what happens when we look exclusively at consumers who are high on mental resources and thus are able to process the benefits of both a similar and a dissimilar experience. Consistent with the shift identified in the process model of self-control, we speculate that, all else being equal (i.e., the similar and dissimilar experiences are of equal attractiveness), consumers who are currently high on mental resources will show higher preference for a dissimilar experience compared to a similar experience. Once a consumer engages in the (cognitively difficult) task of appreciating the benefits of a dissimilar experience, a willingness to balance different goals should make the dissimilar experience more appealing than sticking with a similar experience. This idea implies that as long as consumers have the necessary resources to consider the benefits of the dissimilar experience, they should prefer this experience.
We present three studies to support our conceptualization. Study 1 shows that, after an initial experience, people have higher preference for a dissimilar experience type when their available mental resources are above baseline levels as compared to when their available mental resources are below baseline levels. Study 2 keeps the experience constant, and frames it to be utilitarian or hedonic, to show that this frame determines the appeal of the experience after an initial experience has taken place, depending on the individual's level of mental resources. Finally, study 3 shows that high need-for-cognition (NFC) individuals, who enjoy recruiting and using mental resources, are more likely to choose dissimilar experiences than low NFC individuals. This tendency disappears, however, under high cognitive load, when available resources are limited and cannot be recruited.
STUDY 1: MENTAL RESOURCES AND PREFERENCE FOR DISSIMILAR EXPERIENCES
Study 1 tests the prediction that mental resource level determines preference for a dissimilar experience type. We increased half of the participants' level of mental resources by having them drink a beverage shown to increase mental resources (Kennedy and Scholey 2000) and lowered half of the participants' level by having them engage in a cognitively taxing task. Participants then had an initial experience that was either utilitarian or hedonic. Finally, they were asked to indicate if they preferred to participate in a future utilitarian or hedonic study. We predicted that when the initial experience was utilitarian (hedonic), people in the high mental resource condition would be more (less) likely to participate in a hedonic study than people in the low mental resource condition.
Participants, Design, and Procedure Participants were 175 students (87 females, M age 5 19.76 years, SD 5 2.13 years) participating in exchange for course credit. The design was a 2 (initial experience: utilitarian vs. hedonic) by 2 (mental resources: low vs. high) between-subjects design.
Participants completed two tasks. The first task involved tasting and rating a beverage. In the high mental resource condition, participants drank a glucose-rich drink consisting of 25 grams of glucose powder dissolved in 250 milliliters of water and 25 milliliters of low-calorie orange juice. They then rated its appeal, taste, and sweetness in a filler task that allowed for the glucose to be absorbed. Using the same procedure, Kennedy and Scholey (2000) have demonstrated that the consumption of this beverage increases performance on cognitive tasks. In the low mental resource condition, participants drank a glucose-poor control drink (Kennedy and Scholey 2000) consisting of 3 grams of saccharine powder dissolved in 250 milliliters of water and 25 milliliters of low-calorie orange juice. Participants also rated the appeal, taste, and sweetness of the beverage in a filler task. In order to make this a low mental resource condition, these participants also performed a cognitively effortful task requiring the computation of a string of five difficult calculations (34 Â 8 2 28/4 Â 12 / 4), each presented for 30 seconds. At the end of the calculation, participants were asked to write the solution in a text box.
In the second task, participants watched a 1-minute video clip, which was an educational video about how to clean a shower head (utilitarian experience) or a funny video about a man trying to clean an automatic sliding door (hedonic experience). Participants were then told that we would be conducting two studies in the behavioral lab, and that we wanted to know which study they would prefer to participate in (1 5 much prefer study A, 9 5 much prefer study B). Study A would help students become more productive and efficient in their schoolwork (utilitarian study), while study B would help students have more fun in their free time (hedonic study). Participants answered demographic questions, were thanked, and dismissed.
Pretesting. A pretest (N 5 83), using the mental resource manipulations described above, measured performance on a task (Hyperlink) in which participants were asked to generate as many words beginning with the letter "T" in one minute as they could. We also included a control, no manipulation condition in this pretest to provide evidence that the results in the main study were driven by resources that were above baseline levels, not by the low-resource condition. Participants in the high-resource condition generated more words (M 5 20.21, SD 5 5.17) than participants in the control condition (M 5 17.39; SD 5 4.65; t(58) 5 2.11, p < .05). Participants in the low-resource condition generated fewer words (M 5 14.95; SD 5 4.75) than participants in the control condition (t(61) 5 1.97, p 5 .05). These results provide evidence that the mental resource manipulations worked as intended, increasing or decreasing cognitive output relative to baseline levels.
Results
An ANOVA on interest in the studies revealed an interaction between the first experience and mental resource factors (F(1, 171) 5 10.86, p < .01; see fig. 1 ). After watching a utilitarian video, participants in the high mental resource condition indicated that they would be more interested in the hedonic study (M 5 5.86, SD 5 2.73) than did participants in the low mental resource condition (M 5 4.29, SD 5 2.72; F(1, 171) 5 7.65, p < .01). After watching a hedonic video, participants in the high mental resource condition indicated that they would be less interested in the hedonic study (M 5 4.24, SD 5 2.98) than did participants in the low mental resource condition (M 5 5.53, SD 5 2.93; F(1, 171) 5 3.85, p 5 .05).
Discussion
The results show that people prefer experiences that are dissimilar in the extent to which they are hedonic or utilitarian when their level of mental resources is high compared to when their level of mental resources is low. This supports the role of mental resources in helping people think about a dissimilar experience type. The fact that low mental resource participants preferred a similar second experience suggests that contemplating and appreciating the value of a similar experience is relatively less cognitively taxing than doing the same for a dissimilar experience.
Note that the tasks used to increase and decrease mental resources were not entirely comparable, as low mental resource participants performed a hard calculation task, while high mental resource participants did not perform a calculation task of any nature. It is unlikely that this difference determined the results, as not performing a calculation task did not systematically lead to preference for a specific type of experience. Another possible limitation is that the dependent measure involved preference for a study that would help participants learn about utilitarian or hedonic experiences, not preference for the activities themselves. Thus, it is important to also test our predictions with more comparable mental resource manipulations and a more direct dependent measure, which we do next.
STUDY 2: FRAMING EXPERIENCES AS UTILITARIAN OR HEDONIC
In addition to featuring a more comparable baseline resource condition (as opposed to a low-resource condition used in study 1), study 2 featured more comparable second experiences. Keeping an experience constant and only varying its utilitarian-hedonic nature should ensure that this dimension is important in determining preferences, controlling for the effect of other dissimilarities across tasks. We used a charity event and framed it as either utilitarian or hedonic. When the charity event was framed to be utilitarian, we predicted that participants with a high mental resource level (vs. neutral) would be willing to dedicate fewer hours to the charity event after having had a utilitarian experience, but more hours after having had a hedonic experience. When the charity event was framed to be hedonic, we predicted that participants with a high mental resource level (vs. neutral) would be willing to dedicate more hours to the charity event after having had a utilitarian experience, but fewer hours after having had a hedonic experience.
Participants, Design, and Procedure Participants were 301 students (81 females, M age 5 20.04 years, SD 5 2.29 years) participating in exchange for course credit. The design was a 2 (second experience frame: utilitarian frame vs. hedonic frame) Â 2 (initial experience: utilitarian vs. hedonic) Â 2 (mental resources: neutral vs. high) between-subjects design.
Participants performed three tasks. In the first task, we manipulated mental resources with a word completion task that has been shown to increase performance in several cognitive activities (Albarracín et al. 2008) . Participants were presented with 20 words with missing letters and asked to fill in the letters to complete the words. In the neutral mental resource condition, participants filled in neutral words. In the high mental resource condition, participants filled in 12 neutral words and 8 target words: engage, doing, make, jump, behavior, action, motivation, and active. We chose this task for being a subtle yet robust way to increase mental resources. In Albarracín et al. (2008) , this task was used to prime an action goal, which has implications for both motor behavior and cognitive output. For example, this task promoted greater recall of written material (study 4) and increased the number of SAT problems solved (study 5), which is evidence that an action prime increases the use of mental resources (see also Albarracín and Handley 2011; Hart and Albarracín 2012) . As additional evidence that this task increases the use of mental resources, Laran (2010b) demonstrated that exposure to these words leads to preference for processing a large (vs. small) amount of attribute information. Finally, Puccinelli, Wilcox, and Grewal (2015) demonstrated that sadness depletes people's mental resources, harming their ability to watch energetic commercials. Priming an action goal with a task similar to the one used in this study eliminated this effect and increased brand recall for those participants who watched the same, highly energetic commercial for the brand. Altogether, there is strong evidence that priming an action goal can increase the amount of mental resources used in an array of different information processing tasks.
The second task asked participants to watch an educational video about how to open a wine bottle (utilitarian experience) or a funny video about a dog tasting wine (hedonic experience). In the third task, in order to make it a consequential behavior, participants were told about a charity gala benefiting a local cause. In the utilitarian second experience condition, the gala was described as "a helpful and meaningful event." In the hedonic second experience condition, the gala was described as "a fun and enjoyable event." A pretest asking participants how utilitarian/hedonic each of these events were (1 5 extremely utilitarian, 7 5 extremely hedonic) and comparing the ratings to the midpoint of the scale (four) confirmed that the charity was perceived as utilitarian when described as a helpful and meaningful event (M 5 2.85; t(97) 5 26.48, p < .01) and hedonic when described as a fun and enjoyable event (M 5 4.93; t(97) 5 5.74, p < .01). Participants were asked to indicate how many hours (0-10) they were willing to volunteer for the event. They were then asked to rate the videos they had previously watched (1 5 extremely utilitarian, 7 5 extremely hedonic). Participants who watched the funny video rated it as more hedonic (M 5 5.98, SD 5 1.47) than those who watched the educational video (M 5 3.11, SD 5 1.90; t(300) 5 14.69, p < .01). Participants answered demographic questions, were thanked, and dismissed.
Results

Willingness to
Volunteer. An ANOVA revealed an interaction of the second experience frame, initial experience, and mental resource factors (F(1, 293) 5 22.92, p < .01; see fig. 2 ). In the utilitarian frame condition, there was an interaction between the initial experience and mental resource factors (F(1, 293) 5 12.26, p < .01). Participants who watched a utilitarian video were willing to dedicate fewer hours to the (utilitarian) charity event in the high mental resource (M 5 2.66; SD 5 1.16) than in the neutral condition (M 5 3.81, SD 5 2.48; F(1, 293) 5 7.04, p < .01). However, participants who watched a hedonic video were willing to dedicate more hours to the (utilitarian) charity event in the high mental resource (M 5 3.46, SD 5 1.47) than in the neutral condition (M 5 2.37, SD 5 1.70; F(1, 293) 5 5.31, p < .05).
In the hedonic frame condition, there was also an interaction between the initial experience and mental resource factors (F(1, 293) 5 9.61, p < .01). Participants who watched a utilitarian video were willing to dedicate more hours to the (hedonic) charity event in the high mental resource (M 5 3.91, SD 5 2.61) than in the neutral condition (M 5 2.69, SD 5 1.57; F(1, 293) 5 4.67, p < .05). However, participants who watched a hedonic video were willing to dedicate fewer hours to the (hedonic) charity event in the high mental resource (M 5 2.27, SD 5 1.56) than in the neutral condition (M 5 3.56, SD 5 2.17; F(1, 293) 5 6.56, p < .05).
Discussion
Participants manipulated to have a high level of mental resources were more willing to engage in an experience framed as hedonic (utilitarian) after a utilitarian (hedonic) experience than participants who were not manipulated to have a high level of mental resources. The fact that merely framing an experience as utilitarian or hedonic, thus controlling for other dissimilarities, produced results similar to those of study 1 demonstrates the important role of cognition in people's willingness to engage in a dissimilar experience. It seems that appreciating the benefits of a dissimilar experience type involves more cognitive effort than appreciating the benefits of a similar experience type.
To provide evidence for this claim, we ran a posttest (N 5 135). We had participants watch the educational and the funny videos and then rate "How difficult is it for you to think about the benefits of helping out with the charity event?" (1 5 very easy, 5 5 very difficult). When participants watched the educational video, they indicated lower difficulty when the charity event was described as utilitarian (M 5 2.27, SD 5 .91) than when it was described as hedonic (M 5 2.87, SD 5 1.31; F(1, 131) 5 4.28, p 5 .04). When participants watched the funny video, they indicated higher difficulty when the event was described as utilitarian (M 5 3.03, SD 5 1.18) than when it was described as hedonic (M 5 2.33, SD 5 1.14; F(1, 131) 5 6.84, p 5 .01). These findings support our conceptualization that mental resources drive the differences in preference observed in our studies: people with high mental resource have an advantage executing the more difficult task of thinking about the benefits of dissimilar experiences.
Finally, one could argue that the results were caused by a mere willingness to act associated with the action prime we used. This is unlikely given that the hours participants were willing to work across mental resource conditions did not vary significantly (F < 1). Besides, the high-resource condition showed more motivation to act when the second experience was dissimilar to the first experience, but less motivation to act when the experience was similar. An explanation based on more action (i.e., "do something") motivated by the action prime would predict a main effect of the prime in terms of hours that participants were willing "to act," which was not the case.
In study 3, we examine whether the effects demonstrated in studies 1 and 2 differ for individuals who are (vs. are not) naturally inclined to use their mental resources. Hours to be dedicated to charity as a function of mental resources, framing of charity event, and initial experience (study 2). Error bars represent standard error of the mean.
STUDY 3: THE ROLE OF NEED FOR COGNITION AND COGNITIVE LOAD
Study 3 examines the role of mental resources by investigating how individual differences in the propensity to utilize resources affect preference for similar and dissimilar experiences. We have argued that mental resource utilization can be determined by absolute availability and also by willingness to recruit available resources. In this study, we assess participants' NFC, which is a measure of a person's tendency to think and make use of their cognitive resources (Cacioppo and Petty 1982; Cacioppo, Petty, and Kao 1984) . If our theory is correct, then individuals high (vs. low) on NFC should be more likely to appreciate the benefits of and prefer a dissimilar experience. Importantly, this should only be the case if they have available mental resources to recruit. Thus, in addition to measuring NFC, we manipulated the availability of mental resources by generating cognitive load. We predicted that cognitive load should moderate the relationship between NFC and preference, such that high NFC people under cognitive load would no longer have higher preference for dissimilar experiences.
These results would also rule out a possible alternative account for the previous results, namely that people who currently have high mental resources simply like to shift to dissimilar tasks in order to remain stimulated, a process that would not necessarily involve difficulty in considering a dissimilar task. If these people simply like to shift to dissimilar tasks, then being under cognitive load should not moderate the results, as this mere preference for shifting would not involve the thinking process that is affected by the cognitive load manipulation.
Participants, Design, and Procedure Participants were 128 Amazon Mechanical Turk workers (66 females, M age 5 34.50 years, SD 5 12.81 years) who participated in exchange for a small nominal payment. They were randomly assigned to one of two cognitive load (low vs. high) between-subject conditions.
Participants performed three tasks. The first task was a cognitive load manipulation adapted from Macrae et al. (1993) . Participants were given 45 seconds to remember a sequence of numbers to be recalled later in the experiment. Participants in the low (high) cognitive load condition remembered a sequence of two (eight) numbers. In the second task, participants watched a 1-minute educational video about how to clean a showerhead (utilitarian experience). We then told participants that the third task involved watching another video, and that they could choose to watch "an ad about SUVs" (a utilitarian experience) or "an ad about luxury watches" (a hedonic experience). A pretest (N 5 68) asking participants to rate the videos (1 5 clearly utilitarian, 7 5 clearly hedonic) revealed that an ad about SUVs was perceived as less hedonic (M 5 3.66, SD 5 1.57) than an ad about luxury watches (M 5 5.59, SD 5 1.32; F (1, 67) 5 60.68, p < .01). After making the choice, participants were asked how much mental resource they were able to use when making the video choices (1 5 not much at all, 100 5 a lot), a measure adapted from Allen et al. (2014) . They were then asked if they could remember the string of numbers, and they were requested to fill out the 18-item need for cognition scale (Cacioppo et al. 1984) , which featured items such as "I would prefer complex to simple problems," "I find satisfaction in deliberating hard and long hours," and "I only think as hard as I have to (reversed scaled)."
Results
Choices.
The items measuring NFC were highly correlated (a 5 .95) and were averaged to form a unitary index. A binary logistic regression revealed an interaction between NFC and cognitive load (B 5 .57, SE 5 .29; x 2 (1) 5 3.81, p 5 .05; see fig. 3 ). In the low-load condition, NFC predicted choice such that individuals who scored higher on NFC were more likely to choose the dissimilar, hedonic video (B 5 2.72, SE 5 .23; x 2 (1) 5 10.23, p 5 .01). In the high-load condition, however, NFC did not predict choice (B 5 2.15, SE 5 .19; x 2 (1) < 1, p > .40). We used spotlight analyses to investigate the role of cognitive load for those low and high in NFC. At one standard deviation below the mean of NFC (low NFC), the cognitive load manipulation did not affect choices (B 5 .01, SE 5 .70; x 2 (1) < 1, p > .96), indicating that these participants were unlikely to choose the hedonic video in both load conditions. At one standard deviation above the mean of NFC (high NFC), participants were more likely to choose the hedonic video when they were under low versus under high cognitive load (B 5 1.87, SE 5 .57; x 2 (1) 5 10.58, p < .01), indicating that they chose the dissimilar video only when they had the available resources to do so.
Mediation by Perceived Mental Resources.
A regression analysis revealed an interaction between NFC and cognitive load on perceived mental resources (B 5 26.74, SE 5 2.96; t(124) 5 22.28, p < .05). In the low-load condition, NFC predicted perceived mental resources such that individuals who scored higher on NFC reported higher mental resources (B 5 5.87, SE 5 2.16; t(124) 5 2.71, p < .01). In the high-load condition, NFC did not predict perceived mental resources (B 5 2.86, SE 5 2.02; t(124) < 1, p > .60). Spotlight analyses revealed that at one standard deviation below the mean of NFC, the cognitive load manipulation did not affect perceived mental resources (B 5 1.14, SE 5 7.14; t(124) < 1, p > .90). At one standard deviation above the mean of NFC, participants perceived having more mental resources when they were under low than when under high cognitive load (B 5 2 21.60, SE 5 6.97; t(124) 5 23.09, p < .01).
To examine whether the effect of NFC on choice is mediated by perceived mental resources when participants are under low (but not high) cognitive load, we used model 8 of the PROCESS macro (Hayes 2013) . NFC was used as the predictor variable, cognitive load as the moderator variable, perceived mental resource as the mediator variable, and choice as the dependent variable. In the low cognitive load condition, the pathway from NFC to choices through perceived mental resources (indirect effect) was significant and did not include zero (indirect effect: B 5 2.12, SE 5 .06; 95% CI: 2.30 to 2.02), which supports mediation. In the high cognitive load condition, the same indirect effect was not significant and included zero (indirect effect; B 5 .02, SE 5 .04; 95% CI: 2.06 to .12).
Discussion
The results demonstrate that people who are (vs. are not) naturally inclined to make use of mental resources are more likely to prefer dissimilar experiences, but that limiting available mental resources for these individuals diminishes the likelihood of choosing a dissimilar experience. The results also demonstrate that available mental resource mediates the extent to which people are willing to choose a dissimilar experience. Finally, the fact that the cognitive load manipulation attenuated the effects demonstrates that mental resources do not simply lead to a general preference for shifting. Rather, this preference develops because cognition about a dissimilar (vs. similar) experience is more difficult to generate. We discuss the implications of our findings next.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
People live a number of experiences each day, some of which are hedonic, some of which are utilitarian. This article investigated mental resource utilization, demonstrating how an increase in mental resources influences preference for a sequence of experiences that are similar or dissimilar on the hedonic-utilitarian dimension. Three studies showed that the likelihood of shifting depends on the level of mental resources available during the decision-making process. After watching a utilitarian (hedonic) video, participants found a dissimilar experience (i.e., a hedonic [utilitarian] study) more appealing if they had more mental resources available (study 1). Moreover, people were willing to volunteer more time to a charity event that was framed as dissimilar to an initial experience when they had more mental resource available (study 2). Finally, high NFC individuals were more likely to prefer a dissimilar experience compared to low NFC individuals, but this difference was attenuated under cognitive load (study 3).
Using an array of different experiences and mental resource manipulations, these findings offer insight into how people utilize their available mental resources during consumption episodes and goal pursuits. When consumers have the available mental resources, they use these resources to evaluate the benefits of a dissimilar experience type, and as a result are more likely to engage in this experience. It is important to note that this resource utilization pattern has a bidirectional pattern that holds for both, considering a hedonic experience after having a utilitarian experience and considering a utilitarian experience after having a hedonic experience. Thus, while full consideration of a dissimilar experience type requires cognitive effort, it offers people an opportunity to enjoy the benefits of a balanced life. This implies that a having a balanced life is the result of both lower-and higher-order processes. On the one hand, it involves having the mental resources to consider the ben-efits of dissimilar experiences, which is a lower-order process. On the other hand, it involves motivation to pursue different types of goals, associated with self-control and seeking pleasure, which is a higher-order process. There must be conditions under which higher-order processes are extremely salient (e.g., when people plan their future; Laran 2010a), but actually pursuing goals associated with different types of experiences depends on whether people can process the benefits of these experiences. Future research may be able to disentangle and better understand each of these processes, lower and higher order, and when they interact with or influence motivation independent of each other.
These findings also build upon the process model of selfcontrol failure (Inzlicht and Schmeichel 2012; Inzlicht et al. 2014; Inzlicht and Berkman 2015) , demonstrating that shifting priorities may involve cognitive effort and mental resources and that the same process may be able to explain both types of shift, from utilitarian to hedonic experiences and from hedonic to utilitarian experiences. The process model of self-control failure was originally developed to explain depletion effects, and our findings that people who have a utilitarian experience and are low in mental resources prefer another utilitarian experience are at odds with the original depletion findings (Muraven and Baumeister 2000 ; see also Tuk, Zhang, and Sweldens [2015] for an extensive examination of depletion effects). After all, in a typical depletion procedure, people who perform an initial task that requires self-control, such as eating radish (i.e., utilitarian experience) instead of chocolate, tend to subsequently show less utilitarian behavior than people who do not perform this task. In this regard, it is important to note some differences in each research paradigm.
First, most depletion effects relate to performance in tasks involving self-control (i.e., depletion leads to less persistence in a task), while we exclusively looked at relative preference for certain tasks. Second, half of our findings that challenge depletion research come from conditions in which people are high in mental resources, while depletion research is more concerned with what happens under low resource levels. Third, in the depletion literature, the task with a utilitarian orientation is the same task that uses people's resources, and thus people are depleted precisely because the task just involved self-control. Because of these differences, we cannot reach strong conclusions as to how our findings challenge typical depletion findings. That being said, it could be the case that negative attributions to a (depleting) task lead people to prefer a different task orientation in depletion procedures. Using our conceptualization, people who are depleted (i.e., have low resources) can more easily consider the current experience orientation, which is utilitarian. Because the experience itself has depleted them, they will not see the benefits of this experience. Instead, they will make a negative attribution to the current experience orientation, which will lead to preference for a hedonic experience. Therefore, the typical depletion result may not occur because of the lack of resources, but because of the consequences of the lack of resources for the way people evaluate the initial experience.
Future research will benefit from addressing these issues, using similar procedures, and understanding when low resource levels uniquely lead to a more hedonic orientation versus depend on the extent to which people can analyze the benefits of (dis)similar experiences. For example, using a typical depletion task as the initial experience, the second task can be framed as similar or dissimilar to the initial task and be pretested to be equally attractive across these frames. This would allow for a better test of whether depleting tasks indeed lead to preference for hedonic experiences or only influence performance on utilitarian experiences. On the flip side, might people who are mentally energized perform worse on a subsequent task? A mentally energized person who has just had a utilitarian experience is more likely to prefer a hedonic experience. Thus, this person may not perform well if asked to execute a task with a utilitarian orientation. Investigating whether these effects across preference and task performance occur can be a first step in understanding the role that self-control versus mental resources plays in influencing behavior. The current findings signal possible differences between the resources used to exert self-control and the resources used for thinking and executive function, and it is important to further investigate how one type of resource influences the other and how they interact to determine preference and performance.
The findings are also seemingly inconsistent with the passive goal guidance model (Laran and Janiszewski 2009) . That model proposes that consumers may shift to a different goal even when they are not aware that the initial experience achieved a goal, which suggests the shift can occur without a high level of mental resources. We agree that there are conditions under which shifting does not involve extensive processing (e.g., when benefits are very salient), but it is still important to attempt to reconcile these findings. Viewed through the lens of the procedures adopted by Laran and Janiszewski (2009) , the initial experience makes it very salient that the goal had been achieved or not. In their pilot study, participants were told to eat as many chocolate truffles as they wanted. In study 1, participants were told to resist a chocolate truffle, as this would allow them to achieve a healthy eating goal. Therefore, it seems that when an initial experience highlights goal achievement, mental resources are not necessary for a shift in orientation. In our current procedure, we did not highlight whether the initial experience achieved a goal or not. In this case, it seems that preference for a dissimilar experience will be more likely to occur for consumers who currently have (vs. do not have) a high level of mental resources available. It is important to note that as much as some experiences in the marketplace highlight goal achievement, many do not, making the current paradigm and findings relevant to a broad set of consumer contexts. Future investigations could examine the role of mental resources for situations in which achievement both is and is not highlighted in order to understand whether achievement and mental resource availability can interact to determine preference.
Limitations and Future Research
This research has boundary conditions and limitations that require future attention. Our findings are limited to situations in which the benefits of subsequent experiences are similarly appealing. As hinted at in the previous paragraph, it is easy to come up with examples in which choosing a dissimilar experience type would always be easy, such as when there is strong previous preference for a given experience. This does not contradict our conceptualization. When one experience is significantly more appealing than the other, we should not observe different preference patterns based on mental resources (Shafir 1993) .
There may be additional boundary conditions. First, when individuals are highly motivated to make progress on a goal, be it hedonic or utilitarian, the tendency to shift to a dissimilar experience may be less strong even when resources are available (Deci and Ryan 2000) . Second, even when people do not have the available mental resources, they are likely to prefer a dissimilar experience when the new experience is a socially desirable choice (e.g., help a charity with friends after having gone out the previous night) or associated with an important goal (e.g., have a job interview after having gone out the previous night). Third, personality traits may predict shifting to dissimilar experiences. For example, openness to experience might be positively related to the likelihood of moving from one experience to a dissimilar experience. Given that positive affect has been associated with increased variety seeking (Kahn and Isen 1993) and increased information integration in some cases (Estrada, Isen, and Young 1997) , but a decrease in systematic and effortful processing in others (Ottati, Terkildsen, and Hubbard 1997) , positive affect may lead to preference for similar or dissimilar experiences under different circumstances (Salerno, Laran, and Janiszewski 2015) . Fourth, our investigation focused on second experiences that were positive. If we argue that dissimilar second experiences are preferred under high mental resources because the benefits are easier to process, then similar experiences are likely preferred when the similar and dissimilar experiences have negative attributes. As long as people with high mental resources are better able to process the (negative) attributes of the dissimilar experience, they should show less preference for this experience relative to people with low mental resources. Therefore, while we focused on positive experiences because they are more common in the marketplace (marketers strive to offer positive, not negative experiences), future studies may manipulate the valence of the second experience to verify if valence represents a boundary condition of the effects presented here.
In addition, given the importance of the distinction between hedonic and utilitarian goals (Dhar and Wertenbroch 2000) , we focused on how mental resources influence the pursuit of these opposing goals. It is likely that the effort involved in considering the benefits of utilitarian and hedonic experiences extends to other dimensions, such as approach and avoidance goals. Future research should examine whether our finding that mental resource is necessary to fully consider dissimilar tasks also applies to other differences, such as sweet and salty foods, experiences focused on the present or the future, or the degree of emotional involvement with the experience.
Practical Implications
The findings have important practical implications for how the utilization of mental resources influences people's pursuit of self-control in their lives. First, the findings imply that merely considering inserting hedonic breaks into a utilitarian experience (e.g., work) may be taxing and counterproductive. In fact, considering fewer breaks may have advantages, as people need to go through the process of considering a dissimilar experience fewer times.
Moreover, when mental resources are not available, people may persevere in their current experience orientation. When a person is mentally tired, eating hedonic foods may be more difficult to stop and replace with a healthier choice than when the person is not tired. Consider someone who is having a tasty, hedonic meal at a restaurant. If the patron does not currently have a high level of mental resources (this could depend on the beverage chosen, cues in the environment, individual baseline levels of mental resources), she would likely keep the same orientation and eat dessert. The current hedonic orientation makes it harder to consider the benefits of shifting to a healthy meal as compared to when the current orientation is utilitarian (the customer is having a healthy meal). Similarly, after an initial hedonic purchase, consumers may continue choosing hedonic products when feeling mentally tired. However, engaging in a utilitarian behavior when mentally tired may lead to perseverance in this or other utilitarian behaviors.
In conclusion, we hope that an increased focus on the match between available mental resources and degree of hedonism of a recent experience or experiences will help researchers understand when consumers are more likely to choose utilitarian and hedonic experiences. We also hope that it will help marketers understand how to influence this process and assist individuals in their search to maximize utility and enjoyment of these experiences.
